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Public, by Necessity 
David Dana* & Nadav Shoked** 
 
Protest movements are often indistinguishable from a physical place in 
the public imagination. Consider Tiananmen Square in Beijing, Tahrir 
Square in Cairo, the lunch counters and streets of Greensboro, Selma, 
Montgomery, and other strongholds of the Jim Crow South. The Chinese 
and Egyptian Democracy movements of recent years and the American 
Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s–1960s are inseparable from the images 
of those places; the history and role of those movements can hardly be 
invoked without naming those locations. Another example from the United 
States, and one central to our analysis here, is that of the Occupy Wall 
Street movement, the movement that literally occupied that street through 
its encampment at Zuccotti (formerly Liberty) Park in the heart of New 
York City’s financial district. 
Place—a particular, physical place—can be so important to a protest 
movement because sometimes location is essential to a movement’s goal of 
reaching the constituencies it must engage and persuade. For example, by 
going into Southern lunch counters, the Civil Rights protesters were able to 
reach white Southerners where they lived and press upon them the need for 
change. Equally as important, by taking their protest to the lunch counters, 
and enticing a harsh local Southern response, the protesters were able to 
attract media attention and garner the Northern public support necessary for 
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its eventual triumph.1 Protests against Jim Crow would not have carried the 
same expressive power had they been confined to already-integrated 
venues. 
In the case of Occupy Wall Street, the protest movement had many 
aspirations—even if of debatable coherence—but its overarching call to 
arms was the claim that political power in the United States had been 
hijacked by the economic elite, the so-called “one percent,” and especially 
the financial industry. Occupy Wall Street’s narrative was that public policy 
was subservient to that financial elite, resulting in a financial bubble whose 
bursting led to the recession of 2008. Following the recession, those same 
banking interests, according to Occupy Wall Street, were the primary, if not 
sole, beneficiaries of the public funds spent to resuscitate the national 
economy.  
To make its point, to express its essential message, Occupy Wall Street 
had to be in Wall Street—at the doors of the people and institutions it was 
claiming had all the power and from whom concessions had to be obtained 
if any change were to be attained. Without the visuals of the protesters’ 
presence right next to the titans of finance, the press—a press that intensely 
watches the financial industry—would not take heed, the sounds and sights 
of Occupy protesters would not be shown around the country, and debate 
over the dominion of the one percent would not be fostered. 
Moreover, to be successful in this regard, Occupy Wall Street had not 
only to be located on Wall Street, but it had to be on Wall Street for a 
substantial time. The duration of a protest in a particular place can be vital 
to a movement—as exemplified by the histories from Beijing, Cairo, and 
the Jim Crow South. A brief demonstration against the capital of American 
                                                                                                                     
1 For a history of the sit-ins and why they were ultimately highly effective in prompting 
national debate and legislation, see generally, e.g., M.J. O’BRIAN, THE JACKSON 
WOOLWORTH’S SIT-IN AND THE MOVEMENT IT INSPIRED (2013); MELODY HERR, 
SITTING FOR EQUAL SERVICE: LUNCH COUNTER SIT-INS, UNITED STATES, 1960S (2010). 
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finance could be dismissed as a passing annoyance; a lasting protest could 
not be as readily ignored. Furthermore, to the extent the movement aspired 
at showcasing an alternative, supposedly more egalitarian form of social 
existence, it was imperative to do so at the footsteps of the major banks 
whose form of social control it sought to displace.  
Yet property law—with some elements drawn from constitutional law—
prevented Occupy Wall Street from expressing its message as powerfully as 
it needed to. Occupy Wall Street had only three potential spots for 
protesting at Wall Street itself: a public park that was too tiny to be the site 
of a major protest; Chase Plaza, which was purely private space under New 
York law and thus thought to be out of the question; and Zuccotti Park, a 
privately owned public space (POPS), created when a special permission 
was granted by the city for construction of a taller-than-otherwise-permitted 
skyscraper on the site. 2  Consequently the encampment was established 
there, in Zuccotti Park, and after it persisted for a while, public attention 
skyrocketed; Occupy Wall Street received massive press coverage and 
opinion commentary, some favorable, some not, but all in service of the 
movement’s goal of generating debate over the question of concentrated 
economic and political power in the United States. But soon thereafter, city 
authorities dismantled the encampment, and arrested a number of activists. 
As a result, press coverage of the movement—and arguably the movement 
                                                                                                                     
2 We draw our factual account of Occupy Wall Street heavily from several sources, 
including the collection of essays and accounts in ROLAND V. ANGLIN ET AL., BEYOND 
ZUCCOTTI PARK: FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND THE OCCUPATION OF PUBLIC SPACE 
(Rick Bell et al. eds., 2012); THOMAS OLEASEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT AND PLACE (2012), available at http://www.specialer.sam.au.dk/stat/2012/ 
20051133.pdf; Christine Verbitzsky, The Occupy Wall Street Movement and The 
Constitution, 29 TOURO L REV. 1003 (2012). 
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itself—nearly disappeared.3  Without an ability to protest in a particular 
place, on Wall Street, Occupy Wall Street wilted. 
Since the participants in the encampment who were removed and arrested 
were charged with trespass, the actions of Occupy Wall Street, and the 
authority of the city to have it removed, were litigated in court. During the 
ensuing litigation, the New York court refrained from even considering the 
protest movement’s need to be, and to stay, where it was. The court did not 
engage in a balancing of competing values: the interest of the private owner 
but also the interest of the protest movement. Rather, it simply allowed the 
private landowner and the City to remove Occupy Wall Street. It thereby 
affirmed their power to shut down the protest movement altogether.4 The 
court’s analysis was based on a plausible reading of American property and 
constitutional law. The analysis was consistent with American law’s focus 
on individual “speech” and not on collective speech, or “assembly.” Such a 
focus often leads courts to conclude that expressive values are protected as 
long as protesters can speak somehow and somewhere, even if that means 
that the only avenues open to them are the posting of letters (or, these days, 
emails) to Congress or highly constrained gatherings in sites removed from 
symbolically-laden locations linked to the protest’s meaning. 
Thus the court was not wrong in its reading of American law. We will 
contend here, however, that this approach embraced by American law is 
                                                                                                                     
3 See Nicholas S. Brod, Rethinking A Reinvigorated Right To Assembly, 63 DUKE L.J. 
155, 157–58 (2013); Dylan Byers, Occupy Wall Street Is Over, POLITICO, (Sept. 17, 
2012), http://www.politico.com/blogs/media/2012/09/occupy-wall-street-is-over-135781. 
html (showing how press coverage of income inequality dropped after the Occupy Wall 
Street encampment was removed). 
4 For more information regarding the New York court’s perfunctory decision in People 
v. Nunez, as well as the New York ACLU’s brief arguing for deeper consideration of the 
constitutional issues, see People v. Nunez (Challenging trespassing arrests of Occupy 
Wall Street protesters at Zuccotti Park), NYCLU.ORG, http://www.nyclu.org/case/people 
-v-nunez-challenging-trespassing-arrests-of-occupy-wall-street-protesters-zuccotti-park 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
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wrong. American law, in particular American law of trespass, needs to be 
reconceptualized to allow room for effective protests that can prompt and 
sustain the kind of debate a thriving democracy needs. Specifically, we 
argue for the recognition of a defense against a trespass claim where the 
unauthorized entrants to private property were engaged in a protest that in 
order to be effective, had to be located in that exact place. That space, while 
private by formal ownership rules, must be treated, for this and only this 
limited purpose, as public by necessity. To make this argument, we draw on 
the social science literature emphasizing the centrality of place for protest 
movements, and we join other property law scholars in critiquing, and 
offering a vision that differs starkly from, some recent property law 
scholarship that reifies the right to exclude as the quintessence of property 
in land. 
We also draw, however, on current trends in American law. That is, our 
proposal is not disconnected from the structure and principles of American 
law: we build on important strands in both federal constitutional law and 
state property law. For example, recently four justices of the Supreme Court 
sought to reject the traditional form of constitutional analysis that ignores 
the importance of particular places for certain protests.5 Elsewhere, some 
states’ property laws recognize a balancing of public and private values in 
determining the scope of the private landowner’s right to exclude, and our 
project can be seen as an extension and refinement of that approach.6 
We suggest intensifying the tentative moves made by some such courts. 
The doctrinal proposal we accordingly develop—and more generally, our 
argument for making place important in understanding the rights of 
protesters—has implications extending well beyond the specific example of 
Occupy Wall Street. Our analysis has implications for protests on other 
                                                                                                                     
5 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014). The case will be discussed in Part 
II, infra. 
6 See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971). 
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publicly owned private lands like Zuccotti Park, on common areas in 
private common interest communities, on private land that is open to the 
public for some purposes such as shopping malls, on generally “closed” or 
access-restricted private land, and, indirectly, even on purely public land. 
Thus for example our argument should be kept in mind when considering 
the contemporary example of protests against the real estate developments 
and other initiatives of private universities that are redrawing urban 
landscapes through the use of public powers,7 or of protests at industrial 
farming facilities or nuclear plants, which are often isolated from any public 
space where effective protest could take place.8 
Such examples proliferate since many traditionally governmental powers 
that used to be wielded by public employees in public spaces are now 
privatized and conducted by private corporations on private land. Protest in 
public space facing public actors is therefore simply ineffective in an era of 
sweeping privatization. In localities that have adopted a school vouchers 
scheme, for example, a protest that previously would be directed at a public 
school on public land must, by necessity, be directed at a private school on 
private land. As more activities that were once public are being managed by 
private entities—as more private actors become public—more space that 
was once private is now by necessity public, for certain protest purposes. 
                                                                                                                     
7 For example, New York law has been interpreted to allow Columbia University to use 
eminent domain to vastly extend its geographical footprint into the historically poor and 
minority neighborhood of Washington Heights on the theory that Columbia, although an 
elite private institution, will be serving a civic purpose by providing public good and 
public amenities via the expansion. See generally Kaur v. New York State Urban Dev. 
Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010). 
8 Under current law, efforts to effectively protest near nuclear plants have been thwarted 
through the application of trespass law. See, e.g.,Christine Legere, Activists Found Guilty 
of Trespassing at Pilgrim Nuclear Plant, CAPE COD ONLINE (Mar. 21, 2014), 
http://www.capecodonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20140321/NEWS11/1403299
29/0/NEWS39.  
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It is important not to mischaracterize this critique or proposal we offer as 
overly radical. We do not believe that the current law allows for no effective 
protest. Our point is simply that, as in the Occupy Wall Street case, current 
law might at times unnecessarily deter effective protest. We also do not 
question the focus and importance of the law of trespass. The tort’s concern 
is and should continue to be the private landowner’s interests: even under 
our proposal, as will be seen, the scope and duration of protest even on 
private land that is “public by necessity” would never be unlimited. 
The Article is organized as follows: Part One provides a brief overview 
of the relevant legal scholarship and other academic literature that forms the 
background for our proposal. Part Two traces the role of place and protest 
in American constitutional law, and critiques the law for at best 
inconsistently acknowledging the importance of place for effective protest. 
Part Three explicates the tool employed by property law to exclude 
protesters—the trespass tort—and illustrates how our proposal for 
extending protesters’ rights to a place can be established within it. Finally, 
Part Four engages some possible objections to our proposal. 
I. PROTEST AND PLACE IN THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
The necessity for effective, meaningful protest to be located on specific 
sites, even when those sites are privately owned by third parties, has not 
been a thoroughly analyzed in the academic literature, either outside legal 
academia or within it. Granted, in the fields of urban studies, geography, 
sociology, and critical theory, there has been an increased recognition of the 
centrality of “place” for communities, especially urban communities, and 
for some social movements. Yet this literature, as described below, largely 
does not address the legal aspects and implications of that insight. 
Within legal academia, the public necessity of enabling protest on 
specific private land has received limited direct attention. But much of the 
work in the property field has evolved in a way that seems inconsistent 
with, or even antagonistic to, any claim that private landowners should be 
348 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
LAW, PEACE, AND VIOLENCE 
deprived of a right to prevent unpermitted entry onto their land. Recent 
academic commentators, most notably the highly influential Thomas Merrill 
and Henry Smith, have sought to place the owner’s right to exclude and the 
corresponding absolutist conception of trespass at the core of what property 
in land means.9 Naturally, this stance has generated opposition from other 
prominent scholars, such as Joseph Singer, Gregory Alexander, and 
others, 10  who remain loyal to the legal realist tradition that perceived 
property as a bundle of diverse rights and social obligations—and not 
simply as an individualistic right to exclude. This Article builds on their 
work and extends their central argument to the problem of protest, thereby 
reinforcing the critique of the exclusion-essentialist conception of property. 
In order to do so, this Part reviews the work by these legal academics, after 
first briefly surveying the relevant works in other academic fields. 
“Place”—or, rather, the importance of particular places for community 
and individual self-definition and politics—is an overarching theme of 
much recent literature in social sciences and humanities.11 The centrality of 
place has been recognized specifically in the context of social movements. 
As one commentator notes, “scholars in geography and sociology regularly 
                                                                                                                     
9 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law 
and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property 
Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1002 (2004); Thomas W. Merrill, 
Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 734 (1999). 
10 See generally Joseph Singer, Democratic Estates, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009 (2009); 
LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY 
LINES (2009); LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND 
POWER (2003); Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 
VAND. L. REV. 1597 (2008); Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-
Promoting Approach to Property, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237 (2005); Eduardo M Peñalver, 
Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 863–64 (2009); Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of 
Property, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1517 (2003). 
11 See generally, e.g., HARM DE BLIJ, THE POWER OF PLACE: GEOGRAPHY, DESTINY, 
AND GLOBALIZATION’S ROUGH LANDSCAPE  (2nd ed., 2010); DANIEL KEMMIS, 
COMMUNITY AND THE POLITICS OF PLACE (13th ed., 1992). 
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attend to the implications of theories of place for social movements and 
activism.”12 Scholars in geography, sociology, and related disciplines argue 
that  
[a] discussion of the role of the geographic environment—the 
power of place—in cultural and social processes can provide 
another layer in the understanding and demystifying of the forces 
that effect [sic] and manipulate our everyday behavior. It should be 
read in addition to, rather than instead of, wider discussions of the 
interaction between social groups.13  
Writing in this tradition, Danielle Endres and Samantha Senda-Cook 
distinguish between protests that gain their power from a specific place 
because the place has a pre-existing meaning as a site of historic protest and 
social change, such as the National Mall in Washington, DC, and protests 
that gain power from a specific place precisely because that place is 
associated with an established power or practice the protesters seek to 
challenge. 14  They explain that “place (re)constructions can function 
rhetorically to challenge dominant meanings and practices in a place,” as, 
for example, when supporters of greater bike transportation take over a busy 
lane used by drivers to underscore the need for space for bikers and the 
dominance of car-oriented transportation policies.15 
Employing an ethnographic or case-study approach, this literature on the 
role of place in protest is largely descriptive. For example, geographer Tim 
Cresswell details at length the story of the “Greenham” women—women 
who camped outside a United States military base in the United Kingdom 
for years to protest the United Kingdom’s cooperation with US military 
                                                                                                                     
12 Danielle Endres & Samantha Senda-Cook, Location Matters: The Rhetoric of Place in 
Protest, 97 Q. J. SPEECH 257, 258 (2011). 
13 TIM CRESSWELL, IN PLACE OUT OF PLACE: GEOGRAPHY, IDEOLOGY, AND 
TRANSGRESSION 11 (Minn. Archive ed., 1996). 
14 See Endres & Senda-Cook, supra note 12, at 259. 
15 Id. at 258. 
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programs involving cruise missiles.16 Cresswell explains how the women’s 
encampment, in the rolling hills of the verdant English countryside next to a 
large military base, outraged local officials and residents and garnered 
sustained media coverage—some negative, some positive.17 By virtue of 
their physical location, which in and of itself challenged the United 
Kingdom’s role in American military efforts, and thanks to the long 
duration of the protest, the women were able to have a major cultural 
impact in the United Kingdom.18 
Such literature is largely uninterested in the law: neither in the law’s 
positive role, nor in its desirable role. Given the researchers’ training and 
audience, the case studies are inattentive to the particular legal contexts and 
proceedings and how law did or did not mediate the conflicts. This literature 
unquestionably does express one normative message: the confinement of 
protests to generic zones—sites especially designated for public protest—is 
undesirable, as it “ignores (or perhaps recognizes) the strength that place 
can have for the success of an argument” and “make[s] it possible to 
confine protest and free speech so that ruptures can be avoided entirely.”19 
Turning to the legal academic literature, one finds little addressing the 
specific problem of the form of protest on private lands that is of interest to 
this Article, but finds much work expounding on the importance of 
maintaining a private right of exclusion. In a series of important articles 
about the nature of property law itself, Merrill and Smith, together and 
                                                                                                                     
16 See CRESSWELL, supra note 13, at 97–145. 
17 See id. at 137–44. 
18 See.id. The cruise missiles were eventually removed by virtue of a treaty between the 
United States and what was then the Soviet Union, and not by any explicit action of the 
UK government, but the controversy within the United Kingdom over the missiles 
perhaps facilitated the removal as well. 
19 Endres & Senda-Cook, supra note 12, at 277. See also Don Mitchell & Lynn A. 
Staeheli, Parsing the Fine Geography of Dissent in America, 29 INT’L J. URB. & REG. 
RES. 796, 796–813 (2005). 
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separately,20 have articulated a forceful vision of “property” at odds with the 
bundle of sticks or bundle of rights metaphor, which envisioned the rights 
embedded in real property as various, variable, and socially contingent.21 
They sought to reclaim the res—the physical parcel itself—as the essential 
core of what property means.22 Building on this emphasis on the res, they 
argued that the defining attribute of property in land was the right of owners 
to physically exclude others, all others: the whole world. 23  Because 
exclusion from the res defines the essence of property, it follows that 
protection from trespass must be automatic and hence absolute.24 Trespass 
is, in Merrill and Smith’s terminology, an exclusion regime, not a 
governance regime that entails balancing of different parties’ claims and 
societal interests on a case-by-case basis.  
                                                                                                                     
20 This summary of Merrill and Smith’s work is based on Merrill & Smith, supra note 9; 
Henry E. Smith, Minding the Gap in the Relationship Between Ends and Means in 
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959 (2009); Merrill, supra note 9. There 
are differences between Merrill’s and Smith’s approaches as they have evolved over 
time. See Henry E. Smith, The Thing about Exclusion (Harvard Public Law Working 
Paper No. 14-26, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2449321. But they cohere in endorsing a powerfully exclusion-essentialist conception of 
property. 
21 The bundle of rights metaphor is famously associated with Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, 
Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 
16 (1913). 
22 The most forceful argument for reorienting our idea of property away from the bundle 
of rights metaphor and back to the thing itself was made in Henry E. Smith, Property As 
the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1704 (2012) 
23 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion versus Governance Two Strategies for Delineating 
Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453 (2002); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, 
Nuisance and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1985).  
For other scholars who have articulated an exclusion-essentialist conception of property, 
albeit one that differs slightly from Merrill’s and Smith’s, see, e.g., Larissa M. Katz, 
Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law (Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 08-
02, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1126674; Eric 
R. Claeys, Property 101: Is Property a Thing or a Bundle?, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV.  617 
(2009) (reviewing THOMAS MERRILL & HENRY SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES  AND 
POLICIES (2012)). 
24 Id. 
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Merrill and Smith mostly believe that the law descriptively fits their 
exclusion essentialism conception of property in land. But their claims are 
normative and not just descriptive. They argue that information costs 
justified historically and still justify an absolute right to exclude the whole 
world from the res, with trespass as the enforcement mechanism. An 
exclusion regime with hard-and-fast trespass prohibitions requires less case-
by-case evaluation of information and equities, and is thus more efficient.25 
However, while Merrill and Smith frame their argument as normatively 
rooted in the efficiency concerns typical of law and economics discourse, 
their argument also has a decidedly moral tinge. They argue that the 
information costs-based imperative and conventional morality are mutually 
reinforcing in enshrining an exclusion-centric conception of property in 
land: 
[W]e argue that the critical feature of property rights—that they are 
in rem rights imposing duties of abstention on all other members of 
the relevant community—requires that property rights be regarded 
as moral rights. The nature of property as a coordination device 
among unconnected and anonymous actors, mediated through 
stereotyped things, requires that property rights command 
widespread respect. This respect can only be provided by some 
version of morality that treats violations of possession, theft, 
trespasses, and other gross interferences with property as wrongs 
subject to widespread disapprobation. This moral code—whatever 
its origins and whatever its justification—is backstopped by 
criminal and civil legal enforcement and by self-help. But it is 
implausible to imagine that legal enforcement or self-help, either 
alone or in combination, is sufficient to sustain a system of 
property rights without such a system of morality.26 
                                                                                                                     
25 Id. 
26 Thomas E. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1849, 1852–53 (2007). 
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This position has not gone unchallenged. The exclusion essentialist 
conception of property, with its focus on an absolute enforcement of 
prohibitions against intrusions, has been criticized both doctrinally and 
normatively. It has been assailed as failing to capture the complexity of 
trespass law, let alone of other areas of property law. 27  Similarly the 
information costs rationale for the exclusion essentialism conception of 
property can easily be questioned in an era when information regarding a 
parcel can be digitized and readily accessed.28 
More affirmatively, scholars such as Singer and Alexander argue that 
private law does and should embody social obligations, and in particular, a 
shared commitment to human flourishing.29 In this account, it is plainly 
wrong to regard as trespassers, under the common law, the African-
Americans who conducted lunch counter sit-ins in racially segregated 
restaurants.30 
But while Alexander and Singer use the lunch counter sit-in example of 
protest, their focus is not on the conflict between the entrants’ expressive 
need to protest on private land and the owners’ private property rights. 
Rather they promote the idea that anti-discrimination principles and/or the 
human need for public self-constitution should trump, or be understood as 
modifying, otherwise applicable private property protections. It is not their 
goal to construct a doctrinal argument generally applicable to the tension 
between the needs of protesters to be in specific locations for effective 
protest and the private landowners’ rights to exclude. Similarly, while 
                                                                                                                     
27 Adam Mossoff, The False Promise of the Right to Exclude, 8 ECON J. WATCH 255, 
257–58 (2011). 
28 A similar argument is made by STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 32 n. 32 (2004). 
29 E.g., Alexander, supra note 10, at 765; Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest 
in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988). 
30 Gregory S. Alexander, Property’s Ends: The Publicness of Private Law Values, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1290–91 (2014). See generally Joseph W. Singer, No Right To 
Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1990).  
354 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
LAW, PEACE, AND VIOLENCE 
Singer constructs a powerful “reliance interest” argument for limiting the 
right to exclude where there is a pre-existing relationship between the 
landowner and the parties the landowner now seeks to exclude,31 no such 
relationship, or ensuing reliance interest, is at work in most cases involving 
the collision between protesters and private property owners.32 
The two progressive property scholars whose work does directly 
implicate the question of protest on private land—Eduardo Peñalver and 
Sonia Katyal—argue that expressive trespasses such as the lunch counter 
sit-ins can usher in productive changes in the law and social practice 
generally. They do note that property law may over-deter expressive 
flouting of claimed private property rights.33 But they do not address the 
law of trespass in particular, or argue for any particular doctrinal 
modifications of trespass or other property laws. Indeed, if anything, they 
are concerned that weakening the owners’ right to exclude protesters would 
rob protesters of their expressive power: that power derives precisely from 
the sanctions for trespass that attracts attention to the protesters (when, for 
example, they are arrested). Peñalver and Katyal celebrate (to an extent) 
“property outlaws” because they are outlaws. Without the strong boundaries 
set by trespass they will not be outlaws.34 
At the same time, these scholars and other supporters of a “progressive” 
conception of property clearly endorse a general principle that “property 
law should establish the framework for a kind of social life appropriate to a 
free and democratic society.” 35  This principle, we believe would 
                                                                                                                     
31 Singer, supra note 29, at 611–15. 
32 One exception would be aggrieved employees who “trespass” onto their employer’s 
premises to protest the treatment of employees, or employer opposition to unionization. 
33 EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW 
SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP 213–14 
(2010). 
34 See id. at 32–35, 139–40. 
35 Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. 
REV. 743, 744 (2009 ). 
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unquestionably support an argument for allowing protest on private 
property under some circumstances. We make that argument in this Article. 
Though it has not been adequately addressed in the literature to date, the 
facilitation of protest that can attract attention and prompt discourse 
enabling political change is a necessary element of a framework 
“appropriate to a free and democratic society.”36  
II. PROTEST AND PLACE IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
Before we can make our argument for shifting the law in accordance to 
allow protest on private property under some circumstances, we must 
present the law in its current state. Specifically, we must explain why a shift 
in trespass law is needed. This Part will be dedicated to that task. It will 
review the current treatment of protesters invading land they do not own. 
That treatment, as will become apparent, is extremely hostile—even in the 
supposedly easier case of protesters on public land. American law as it 
stands today is insensitive to the insights of the non-legal literature 
respecting the importance of place to speech and to those of the progressive 
property literature regarding the limited reach of the rights of ownership. 
A. Freedom of Speech in Private Spaces 
As far as the specific case of speech on private land is concerned, 
American law has taken a decisive turn towards the absolutist, exclusion-
centric, protection of property rights—at least as far as constitutional law 
goes. In dismissing in an almost offhand manner the constitutional freedom 
of speech claim of the Zuccotti Park protesters, whose plight launched this 
Article’s discussion, the New York court merely reflected the legal attitude 
as it now stands in America.37 This subsection will survey the emergence 
                                                                                                                     
36 Id. 
37 See generally People v. Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d 857 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012) 
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and development in American constitutional law of this hostile approach 
towards speech on private land. 
The demands made by the Zuccotti Park protesters present a simple legal 
problem. Such protesters are asking for a constitutional protection—the 
protection extended to free speech—not against a public entity, but against 
private parties. They are asking the owner of Zucotti Park, not the 
government of New York or New York City, to respect their freedom of 
speech rights. Ordinarily, American law holds that constitutional 
protections only apply where there is “state action.”38 That is to say, an 
individual can raise a valid constitutional complaint only against the 
government.39  Thus, while the protesters could have demanded that the 
government allow them to protest in the tiny public park nearby, they could 
not demand the same from the private owner of Zuccotti Park. Technically 
speaking, when the owners of Zuccotti Park relied on trespass remedies to 
remove the protesters, they enforced a legal tool from private law in order to 
protect a private interest. Seemingly, no state action was involved.40 
At an earlier time, the United States Supreme Court was willing to 
overlook the absence of such state action in extending free speech 
protection to protesters. In fact, the Court believed that the nature of the 
place—rather than the nature of the place’s owner—determined whether 
public action, justifying constitutional protections, was involved. In Marsh 
v. Alabama, the Court held that, in a company town, the private corporation 
                                                                                                                     
38 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (respecting the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) 
(respecting the First Amendment). An obvious exception is the Thirteenth Amendment, 
which explicitly applies to private action. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 
U.S. 409 (1968). 
39 Id. 
40 This is, at best, only technically true. In actuality, the state was inevitably involved. 
The state employs its powers—through the police or the courts—to enforce the owner’s 
trespass claim. Without such state backing, the owner’s trespass claim is meaningless. 
See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1948). 
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owning the streets could not employ the trespass tort to abridge freedom of 
expression and religions rights. 41  Consequently, the company could not 
exclude a number of Jehovah’s Witnesses who undertook to distribute 
religious literature in the streets. When later, in Amalgamated Food 
Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., the Court extended 
this ruling to protect protesters in a private shopping mall, it read Marsh to 
imply that “under some circumstances property that is privately owned may, 
at least for First Amendment purposes, be treated as though it were publicly 
held.”42 In accordance, the Court decided in that case that a privately held 
mall was the “functional equivalent” of a public street or business district, 
and thus should be treated as such.43 
These Court decisions were based on the quasi-public nature of the place 
where trespassers sought to exercise their rights of speech. The streets in a 
company town or in the mall were too public-like to be treated as private 
space. But in Logan Valley, the Court mentioned another justification for 
opening the mall to the protesters. It wasn’t only that the mall resembled a 
public street and was thus important as an arena for speech for the public in 
general; the mall also held specific importance to that one particular group 
of protesters. Since these were employees demonstrating against a business 
in the mall, there was no other location where their protest could be truly 
effective. Thus, the Court felt compelled to open that space to them.44 
Four years later, the Court began to retreat from its earlier rulings 
expanding the freedom of speech into private spaces such as malls. It 
limited the Logan Valley holding to that case’s facts precisely by restricting 
free speech rights to cases where the specific private space was necessary 
                                                                                                                     
41 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946). 
42 Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 316 
(1968). 
43 Id. at 319. 
44 Id. at 321–23. 
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for the particular protest.45 The Court explained in Lloyd Corporation v. 
Tanner that the decision in Logan Valley  
was carefully phrased to limit its holding to the picketing involved, 
where the picketing was “directly related in its purpose to the use 
to which the shopping center property was being put,” . . . with the 
consequence that no other reasonable opportunities for the pickets 
to convey their message to their intended audience were 
available.46 
The Lloyd decision was thus meant to, and did, curb the allowable realm 
for speech on private space. Yet it did so in a manner that was acutely aware 
of the importance of specific locations for particular messages. The rule as 
it emerged from Lloyd and Logan Valley was that a location’s status as 
private space was no defense against free speech when that speech was 
directed at activities taking place in that location. This approach mirrors the 
insights of the non-legal literature expounding on the importance of specific 
locations for certain forms of speech, as reviewed in Part I. Yet, 
unfortunately, the Supreme Court abandoned this attitude within a few years 
after handing down its decision in Lloyd. 
In 1976, the Court announced that its own rulings expanding the reach of 
freedom of speech into private properties had gone too far—even after 
Lloyd had already curbed much of their original range. In Hudgens v. 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Court completed the move it 
only partially made in Lloyd. It outright overruled the Logan Valley 
decision. 47  Logan Valley, the Court reasoned, was based on a 
misunderstanding of the Constitution and the Court’s earlier rulings. The 
Justices explained that beyond the very specific and rare circumstances of 
Marsh v. Alabama—that is to say, outside of company towns—there is no 
                                                                                                                     
45 Lloyd Corp., Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 563 (1972) quoting, Logan Valley, 391 
U.S. at 320 n. 9. 
46 Id. 
47 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518 (1976). 
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basis for applying the constitutional protection of speech where state action 
is absent.48 That federal holding still stands today. 
A handful of states rejected this new attitude. Based on their own 
constitutions, they continued to abide by the spirit of decisions such as 
Logan Valley. These states still hold that entrants to certain private spaces—
such as malls—can avail themselves of free speech protections. Yet state 
courts (and legislatures) base their decisions on the quasi-public nature of 
those spaces (i.e., the primary justification in the Marsh and Logan Valley 
decisions), rather than on the importance of a location for a particular form 
of speech (the Lloyd rationale).49 Hence, even in states extending a liberal 
interpretation to freedom of speech privileges, these privileges are only 
enforced in private spaces that closely resemble public spaces. Accordingly, 
most states limit the application of the doctrine to shopping malls and 
sometimes universities. The nature of the speech, and its relationship to a 
specific location, is irrelevant in all these states. Even the state that has 
adopted the most radical interpretation of freedom speech rights, New 
Jersey, which went as far as to protect such rights in spaces owned by a 
homeowners association—since they resembled traditional public spaces—
                                                                                                                     
48 Id. at 518. 
49 E.g., Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55 (Colo. 1991); Robins v. Pruneyard 
Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1979) aff’d sub nom. PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. 
Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int’l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590 
(Mass. 1983) (allowing limited freedom of speech right for candidates to solicit 
nominating signatures in reasonable and unobtrusive manner at shopping center mall); 
Alderwood Assocs. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981) (same) but 
Waremart, Inc. v. Progressive Campaigns, Inc., 989 P.2d 524, 527 (Wash. 1999) (holding 
the right only applies to malls, not to smaller stores, since malls resemble traditional 
downtown); N.J. Coal. Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 
757 (N.J. 1994); State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (N.J. 1980) (extending freedom of 
speech to university’s property when the university devoted that property to public use). 
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noted that if the association gives the owner other places to protest, the 
restriction on speech can persist.50 
In sum, by the time the Occupy Wall Street movement came along, the 
opening that American law used to offer for protest on private space when 
that space held particular importance for the specific protest had closed. In 
retrospect, this development should not have been surprising; the Supreme 
Court has also refused to acknowledge the importance of place for speech in 
the supposedly far easier case of protest on public, rather than private, 
space. We turn to review the jurisprudence respecting this latter case now. 
B. Freedom of Speech in Public Space 
Earlier in this Part we stated that the Occupy Wall Street protesters’ legal 
standing was precarious because they chose to protest on the private 
space—Zuccotti Park—rather than the nearby tiny public park. However, 
while they may have been extended more legal leeway had they been 
protesting in the public park, it is far from clear that the city, as the owner 
of that public space, would not have been able to limit their right to protest 
even there.51 This observation lends more urgency to this Article’s core 
insight regarding the law’s failure to address the needs of protesters. 
Even before it curbed the right to protest on private spaces in the 
Hudgens decision, the Supreme Court had demonstrated its disregard for the 
importance of place for speech in decisions allowing the government to 
                                                                                                                     
50 Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Khan, 46 A.3d 507, 519 (N.J. 2012); 
Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 103 A.3d 249, 258 (N.J. 2014) (“To assess 
the reasonableness of the Board’s restriction [on speech], we consider whether 
convenient, feasible, and alternative means exist for [plaintiff] to ‘engage in substantially 
the same expressional activity.’”) (internal citation omitted). 
51 Indeed, the New York court refusing to block the ejectment of the protesters assumed 
arguendo that the private owner must treat Zuccotti Park as if it was a public space for 
First Amendment purposes, and still ruled against the protesters. Waller v. City of New 
York, 933 N.Y.S.2d 541, 544 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011). 
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limit speech in purely public spaces. For example, in Adderley v. Florida,52 
the Court was faced with the case of students who protested at the jailhouse 
where other students who had tried to integrate theaters were being 
detained. In his majority opinion, Justice Black emphatically rejected the 
trespassers’ claim that “this ‘area chosen for the peaceful civil rights 
demonstration was not only “reasonable”’ but also particularly 
appropriate’” for a right to protest arrests.53 He explained that the claim’s  
major unarticulated premise [is] the assumption that people who 
want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right 
to do so whenever and however and wherever they please. That 
concept of constitutional law was vigorously and forthrightly 
rejected in two of the cases petitioners rely on . . . We reject it 
again.54 
This statement reflects an incisive dismissal of the claim that a specific 
place may be required for effective protest—as the jailhouse clearly was for 
protesting the arrests of those held there. Black’s pronouncement was made 
in reliance on an array of Court decisions permitting government to limit 
protest even in public spaces normally opened to the public—like streets or 
plazas in front of jails or courthouses—to prevent interferences with their 
normal use.55 These cases apply a general rule that has become central to 
American freedom of speech jurisprudence. Government, even if not 
allowed to completely ban speech, may adopt reasonable regulations of 
speech, pertaining to the manner, time, and place, allowed for the speech.56 
This rule was used against Occupy Wall Street protesters throughout the 
                                                                                                                     
52 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). 
53 Id. 47–48 (internal citations omitted). 
54 Id. (emphasis added). 
55 E.g., Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 616 (1968); Cox v. State of Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 559 (1965). 
56 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989). 
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nation who were camping, unlike their New Yorker brethren, in public 
spaces.57 
This formula hinders place-specific protest. The equation of place 
regulation with the regulation of time and manner obscures the special 
standing that place may hold for protest. It also obscures the tendency of 
place regulation to burden some protests more than others. By closing a 
space to protesters, government is interfering with protest that is place-
specific to that place. The allowance for reasonable place regulation of 
specific sites is an allowance for the targeting of specific protesters, in 
contrast to the requirement that non-content-neutral regulation of speech be 
subject to strict scrutiny.58 A Supreme Court decision from the past spring 
illustrated this problem, and four Justices expressed unease about it. In 
McCullen v. Coakley the Court struck down a state law erecting a buffer 
zone, where protest was prohibited, in the public space surrounding 
abortion clinics.59 The Justices in the majority concluded that the buffer 
zone was not a reasonable time, manner, and place restriction and hence 
rejected it.60 Agreeing with this result but repudiating this mode of analysis, 
a dissenting Justice Scalia reckoned that the regulation should have been 
analyzed as a content-based restriction, rather than as a time, manner, and 
place restriction. He insisted that the buffer zone law was targeting a 
specific speech.61 Because the law solely applied to protest in the vicinity of 
abortion clinics, it inevitably addressed anti-abortion protest. Scalia’s 
                                                                                                                     
57 City of Chicago v. Alexander, 2014 IL App (1st) 122858 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 23, 2014); 
Occupy Sacramento v. City of Sacramento, 878 F. Supp. 2d. 1110, 1123–24 (E.D. Cal. 
2012); Mitchell v. City of New Haven, 854 F. Supp. 2d 238, 241 (D. Conn. 2012); 
Davidovich v. City of San Diego, No. 11-cv-2657 WQH-NLS, 2012 WL 439642, at *7 
(S.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2012); Occupy Tucson v. City of Tucson, No. CV-11-699-TUC-CKJ, 
2011 WL 6747860, at *8 (D. Ariz. Dec. 22, 2011); Freeman v. Morris, No. 11-cv-00452-
NT, 2011 WL 6139216, at *1 (D. Me. Dec. 9, 2011). 
58 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000). 
59 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518 (2014). 
60 Id. at 2534. 
61 Id. at 2543 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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insight is almost undeniable. Anti-abortion protest is most effective when 
taking place in front of a clinic. It is a speech for which a specific location is 
necessary. That location is critical only for that specific protest. Thus, while 
ostensibly all forms of speech were prohibited there, the law could not 
genuinely be characterized as neutral between different topics of speech. 
  The majority declined this reasoning, explaining that the state targeted 
not the speech but its effect.62  Hence, the speech prohibition would have 
been upheld had it been more reasonable. Although this reasoning and 
result is inattentive to the realities of protest and the insights of the non-
legal literature reviewed in Part I, it undeniably reflects the consistent 
attitude of American freedom of expression law, as seen in this Part.   
American law has reached this result—whereby constitutional 
jurisprudence is wholly insensitive to the import of place for protest—due 
to yet another, seemingly unrelated doctrinal development: the downplaying 
of the right of assembly in favor of a right of association. The First 
Amendment protects not only the freedom of speech, but also the freedom 
of assembly.63 Unlike the former, which can be read narrowly as referring to 
an activity that is individual at heart, the latter is clearly a communal right, 
and contains an undeniable spatial aspect. The right to assemble is by 
definition the right of people to come together and congregate in a specific 
location.64 Furthermore, in light of its placement in the Bill of Rights and 
the historical circumstances of its adoption, there is little doubt that the 
constitutional right of assembly was intended to refer to the right of 
communal protest. 65  Nonetheless, in the twentieth century the right to 
                                                                                                                     
62 Id. at 2531. 
63 The “right of the people peaceably to assemble[.]” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
64 The Oxford Dictionary defines the verb “assemble” as follows: “gather together in one 
place for a common purpose.” OXFORD DICTIONARY 94 (2nd ed., 2005). 
65 Other rights contained in the First Amendment, surrounding the right to assemble, 
unquestionably deal with protest-serving activities: freedom of speech, and also the right 
to petition the government. In the struggle with England leading to independence, 
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assemble has been mostly used as the constitutional basis for a related, yet 
different, right: the right of association.66 The Warren Court established the 
right of association in order to expand the protection afforded to political 
rights to organize.67 But by de-mooring the right of political association 
from its limited origins in the communal right to meet for protest, this move 
lessened the constitutional case for a right to protest in specific places. The 
right to assembly has lost most of its luster and is rarely effectively relied 
on by protesters. 68  Protesters are thus left to rely on the right to free 
speech—an individual rather than communal right, and a right whose 
association with a specific place can always be challenged. 
As already seen, the Supreme Court has proven particularly prone to 
challenge this association.69 American constitutional law does not, in 2014, 
offer promising avenues for action on behalf of those arguing for greater 
protection for the place-related rights of protesters to assemble—whether 
they seek to express their aversion to abortion clinics or to Wall Street. Yet 
we believe that the problem of the Protesters in Zuccotti Park can be solved 
regardless. Constitutional law might offer them little aid. Property law, to 
which we turn now, recommends a much more promising attitude. 
III. PROTEST AND PLACE IN AMERICAN PROPERTY LAW 
Part I of this Article put forward the normative case on behalf of the 
Occupy Wall Street protesters and others. It stressed the insight, prevalent 
in the social sciences, that often a particular location is necessary for protest 
                                                                                                                     
assemblies—both formal such as the Continental Congress and informal such as the acts 
of street mobs and protesters—played a key role. 
66 For a general, and excellent, discussion of the issue, see Brod, supra note 3 (noting 
that it has been 30 years since the Supreme Court authored an opinion that rested on the 
Assembly Clause). 
67 See generally NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
68 The Occupy Wall Street cases on which this Article draws present a clear example. 
For more, see Brod, supra note 3, at 153–58. 
69 See Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 518; Adderley, 385 U.S.  at 47–48. 
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in light of the protesters’ specific message. Part II surveyed American 
constitutional law, and discovered that it does not extend any protection for 
such protesters. Nonetheless, theirs is not a lost cause in American law. 
They have no recourse in the legal protection of speech; but, paradoxically, 
the legal protection of property should have come to their rescue. For, as we 
shall see in this Part, property law can, and should, absolve such protesters 
of liability for trespass in light of its own doctrines. 
As mentioned earlier, and assumed throughout the discussion, the tort of 
trespass is the legal tool by which property law protects the owner’s right to 
his or her property.70 For those committed to reading property as first and 
foremost the right to exclude, trespass, as the practical embodiment of the 
right, is thus the key element of this body of law. Accordingly, authors such 
as Merrill and Smith stress that trespass is a particularly robust tort.71 The 
elements a plaintiff must prove in a trespass suit are indeed minimal. She or 
he must solely demonstrate that the defendant intentionally entered land that 
the defendant did not hold a right to possess.72 The plaintiff/owner need not 
even prove that any harm was suffered as a result of said entrance.73 
Yet the trespass tort also recognizes a defense. An entrance to the land of 
another will not constitute trespass when that entrance is privileged.74 The 
existing common law recognizes at least three categories of privileged 
                                                                                                                     
70 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
71 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at 394. 
72 Bayou Fleet P'ship v. Clulee, 150 So. 3d 329, 334 (La. Ct. App. 2014). The intent 
requirement is minimal: it is satisfied when the intruder acted willfully. As one cout 
explained: 
Trespass is an intentional harm at least to this extent: while the trespasser, to be 
liable, need not intend or expect the damaging consequence of his intrusion, he 
must intend the act which amounts to or produces the unlawful invasion, and the 
intrusion must at least be the immediate or inevitable consequence of what he 
willfully does, or which he does so negligently as to amount to willfulness. 
Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 121 N.E.2d 249, 250–51 (N.Y. 1954). 
73 Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997). 
74 E.g., Mueller v. Allen, 128 P.3d 18 (Utah Ct. App. 2005). 
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entrance: necessity, invitation, and public policy. 75  We argue that a 
normatively sensitive reading of these should cover, as privileged, the entry 
to private land of protesters whose protest is tied to that specific place that 
they enter. We argue that law privileges the entrance of the Occupy Wall 
Street protesters to Zuccotti Park because, for them, that place is public by 
necessity. 
A. Necessity Defense 
The necessity defense appears as the natural doctrinal resting point for 
the protection for protesters suggested in this Article; after all, we title the 
interest meriting protection—as well as this Article itself—public by 
necessity. Yet in light of the current elements of the necessity defense in the 
common law, this specific defense is not a suitable grounding for protecting 
protesters, and we do not believe that it should be. 
Necessity privileges an entry into the land of another, when, among other 
things, such an entrance is necessary in order to prevent imminent physical 
harm and there is no other, legal, manner of averting that harm.76  The 
quintessential example for the application of the necessity defense is the 
case of a ship docking in a privately held pier in its effort to evade a 
storm.77 The sailor is faced with the imminent danger of drowning and the 
only way to avert this harm is by docking in the private space. Hence, his or 
her entry to the pier is privileged by necessity (though he or she might be 
liable for damages to the pier caused by the entry).78 
Protesters have recently tried to rely on this same argument. 79  They 
claimed that their entry to private land was privileged through necessity, 
                                                                                                                     
75 JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY 34–49 (3d ed. 2010). 
76 U.S. v. Schoon, 955 F.2d 1238, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 1991). 
77 E.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908). 
78 E.g., Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). 
79 E.g., Schoon, 955 F.2d at 1239–40 (protesting US aid to a repressive regime at the 
IRS); United States v. Scranton, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1131 (D. Idaho 1997) aff’d, 165 F.3d 920 
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because their protest in that location was the only way to avert imminent 
harm. Thus, for example, entrants argued that protesting against the 
presence of a nuclear plant will avert nuclear war (or nuclear accidents). 
Such claims are routinely denied since it is hard for protesters to establish 
that they meet the requirements, noted above, for the necessity defense. 
There is no proof that the relevant danger—for example, nuclear war—is 
imminent,80 or that the trespassing act will avert it—that due to the protest 
nuclear operations will be halted. 81  Even if all these requirements are 
somehow met, the plaintiff/owner could still argue that there were other 
ways to avert the harm—for example by lobbying government or 
challenging the activity in court and thereby stopping the protested 
activity.82 
The hostile position of the courts in these cases is understandable. The 
claimants request that the courts accept as fact a hypothetical—and often, 
                                                                                                                     
(9th Cir. 1998) (protesting logging by trespassing in a forest); United States v. Katzberg, 
201 F.R.D. 50, 53 (D.R.I. 2001) (protesting nuclear warfare at a naval base); United 
States v. Turner, 44 F.3d 900 (10th Cir. 1995) (protesting at an abortion clinic). 
80 United States v. Kelly, No. CR10-5586BHS, 2010 WL 4857795 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 
22, 2010) aff’d, 676 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Defendants have not established the 
existence of imminent harm at the time they attempted to symbolically disarm nuclear 
weapons kept at the Bangor base”). 
81 E.g., United States v. Sued-Jimenez, 275 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Appellants offered 
no evidence to support their claim that their trespassory protests will result in a change of 
U.S. Naval policy so that the bombing and ammunition testing in Vieques will cease.”); 
United States v. May, 622 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 984 (1980). 
82 E.g., Scranton, 25 F.Supp.2d at 1134, aff’d, 165 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1998) (determining 
that there was no necessity to trespass since the Defendant could have pursued 
administrative or judicial remedies to cure each alleged environmental violation cited); 
Katzberg, 201 F.R.D. at 53 (explaining that defendants need not have trespassed since 
they could have written to their congressman, written editorials to be published in the 
newspaper, distributed pamphlets discussing their cause, or picketed in a public space); 
Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 929 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting the necessity defense was 
unavailable to abortion protestors because legal alternatives existed to achieve their goal 
of persuading women not to have abortions); United States v. Maxwell-Anthony, 129 
F.Supp.2d 101, 105 (D.P.R. 2000). 
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slightly ludicrous—chain of events. If they are to avoid these futile 
exercises and still rule for the protesters, courts will have to relax the 
requirements for the necessity defense in general. For example, they will 
have to omit the requirement that the danger to be averted must be 
imminent, or that no other way to avert it be possible. Any such change to 
the doctrine will affect not only the case of protesters, but also that of other 
trespassers. Thus, for example, sailors will be protected against trespass 
claims by owners of piers even if they chose to dock there when the threat 
of the storm was not imminent, or even if there were other piers open to the 
public that they could have resorted to. There may or may not be a 
normative case for such a general lessening of the necessity defense. Our 
discussion, or the predicament of protesters in general, has very little 
bearing on this issue. Thus, we are not well placed to endorse here such a 
reform of the laws. 
While we argue for protecting protesters against trespass claims, and 
although we rely on the word necessity in so doing, we do not believe that 
the necessity defense is the adequate answer to the plight of protesters. The 
reason is rather simple: we are not arguing that the protest is necessary, as 
the claimants seeking this defense have. Rather, we argue that the place is 
necessary for the protest—whatever the merits or potential results of that 
protest. This argument cannot establish a valid necessity defense, but it can 
be relevant under the other defenses to trespass. 
B. Invitation Defense 
An entry to another’s land is privileged, and therefore not a trespass, 
when the entrant was invited by the owner or possessor of that land.83 Stated 
this way, the invitation defense is little more than a technical way to reach 
the obvious result: a licensee is not a trespasser. But the invitation defense 
                                                                                                                     
83 Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 217 (Colo. 2003). 
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has a more expansive role. The common law has consistently held that the 
invitation shielding the entrant from a trespass claim need not be explicit.84 
As a result, a host of entrants and activities to whose presence an owner did 
not consent are held to have received an invitation. 
The intuitive rationale behind the invitation defense is that, if an owner 
opened land to a person, he or she cannot later on claim that the person is a 
trespasser. Based on this rationale, courts have held that once an owner 
opens land to the public at large, even if only for certain purposes—say, 
shopping or dining—he or she concedes the right to fully define the 
contours of that invitation.85 There is a stark difference, in this respect, 
between the owner opening the land to an individual invitee and the owner 
opening the land to the general public. When a residence’s owner invites a 
friend for dinner, the friend is privileged when entering the residence and 
dining there. The entry will no longer be privileged if the friend unilaterally 
decides to also stay for the night. Conversely, if an owner opens his or her 
store to the public, a person entering the store with no intention of buying 
anything is privileged even though he or she entered for a purpose different 
from that for which she was invited.86 
This broad notion of invitation to the public has served the common law 
to force innkeepers and common carriers to serve all customers.87 It is the 
justification for public accommodation laws that privilege the entrance of 
all individuals to businesses into which they were not invited due to their 
race.88 It is the basis for the right of a reviewer to be at the restaurant even 
                                                                                                                     
84 E.g., Martin v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 421 So. 2d 109, 111 (Ala. 1982). 
85 See Uston v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 445 A.2d 370 (N.J. 1982) (presenting an 
extreme application of this principle). 
86 Desnick v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351 (7th Cir. 1995). 
87 See generally Singer, supra note 30. 
88 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§2000a-a6 (2006)). 
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though the owner may not desire his or her presence.89 Furthermore, in the 
eyes of at least two circuit courts of appeals,90 it is this privilege born of the 
explicit invitation that shields investigative reporters when they enter a 
business. As held in those cases, even though investigative reporters 
commit fraud in order to enter the business—they deceive the owner into 
thinking they are consumers or employees—their entrance is privileged 
through invitation.91 
The rule in all these cases is simple. Once an owner opens her land to the 
public, his or her ability to exclude does not disappear. However, his or her 
ability to freely pick and choose among public members or public activities 
is highly constrained. The same reasoning should apply to the protest cases. 
Once an owner engages in a public activity on her land, one that affects or 
seeks to affect public policy or decision-making, he or she cannot resist the 
entrance of members of the public who desire to contest his or her role. An 
owner of land quartering a political party or association, a lobbying group, 
an organization exercising financial or policing powers traditionally held by 
public bodies, or an entity playing an inflated role in the nation’s life has 
entered the public domain. And by throwing herself into the public realm 
she invited others to engage her in the public discourse she is promoting. 
An analogy can be found in the law of libel. A public figure cannot avail 
herself of libel laws to shield her reputation or feelings from critical 
publications to the same extent that a private citizen can.92 By entering the 
public arena, an individual implicitly renounces some of the legal rights he 
or she otherwise enjoys so that the freedom of speech rights of others be 
respected and a thriving political arena persist. The case of private land on 
which public activity takes place is very similar. When using her land as the 
                                                                                                                     
89 Desnick v. Am. Broad. Companies, Inc., 44 F.3d 1345, 1351 (7th Cir. 1995). 
90 Id.; Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999). 
91 Id.  
92 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
Public, by Necessity 371 
VOLUME 13 • ISSUE 2 • 2014 
focal point for public policy-making, the owner renounces some of the 
property law protections that otherwise cover the land. That owner chose to 
create a situation whereby the only way to effectively protest a certain 
public policy is to demonstrate on her land. She cannot then turn around and 
claim that she did not invite the protesters. 
Thus, protesters demonstrating against a specific activity taking place on 
the land enjoy, based on the logic of the common law invitation cases alone, 
a defense against trespass claims. The specific case of the Occupy Wall 
Street protesters is even more compelling. The common law’s rule 
respecting the broad invitation into public spaces perceives spaces as 
located not on a private/public dichotomy, but along a private/public 
continuum.93 There are purely private spaces—like the home—where an 
invitation is construed narrowly (recall the example of the dinner 
invitation). There are purely public spaces—like the public park—where the 
invitation is construed broadly; the invitation to enter these spaces is almost 
all encompassing. In between, there are places that are private yet open, to 
differing degrees, to the public. In such spaces the owner does not enjoy the 
freedom to limit her invitation as she may when entry to her house is 
involved.94 Zuccotti Park was such a quasi-public space and more. It was 
formally declared, by the city and the owner, as a quasi-public space.95 
Recall: it was a privately owned public space (POPS). The owner herself 
dedicated it to public use. The owner herself announced that it was open to 
the public in the broadest sense of the words open and public.96 
                                                                                                                     
93 Desnick, 44 F.3d at 1351 (providing a similar argument made by Judge Posner). 
94 Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971). 
95 People v. Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d 857, 861 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012). For more on the 
regulation of such places, see City of New York Zoning Resolutions 37-50–37-70 (N.Y. 
2007–2011), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/zone/art03c07.pdf. 
96 As a POPS, the Park had to remain open 365 days a year, 24 hours a day, seven days a 
week. Nunez, 943 N.Y.S.2d at 861.  
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Even more so than when they enter typical private spaces into which 
members of the public have been invited, such as stores or restaurants, the 
entry of individuals into POPS should enjoy a broad privilege. At the very 
least, when they enter in order to protest the public activities of owners of 
the POPS, or those closely associated with them, such entrants must be 
viewed as if they were invitees. 
C. Public Policy Defense 
Protesters should be shielded from trespass claims in certain cases 
through the invitation defense to trespass. Furthermore, there are still 
additional good reasons to privilege such protesters under the final category 
of privileged entries: those that serve public policy. Public policy “is a 
catch-all category for intrusions that are privileged because significant 
public policies override private interests in exclusive possession.”97 Often, 
these public policies are used to augment the privilege extended by law 
based on invitation. That is to say, the invitation granted by the owner to 
certain members of the public will be interpreted broadly, beyond the 
owner’s own intent, due to public policies. 
Hence, for example, a landlord cannot block her tenants from inviting 
guests,98 or the migrant workers he or she houses on the land from having 
service providers visit.99 Even if the lease or license between the owner and 
the occupant of the land explicitly states otherwise, due to public policy 
considerations in protecting weak occupants, the owner will be viewed as if 
he or she did invite the occupant’s guests. The public interest in an 
invigorated democratic arena, where public policies can be questioned and 
debated effectively, similarly requires that the invitation extended by an 
owner who engages in public policy making be interpreted broadly. 
                                                                                                                     
97 SINGER, supra note 75, at 39. 
98 Williams v. Lubbering, 63 A. 90, 91 (N.J. 1906). 
99 State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971). 
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Indeed, in the case of a POPS, government has come very close to 
actually stating that it believes there is a public interest in keeping that 
space open. A POPS was created because the relevant local government 
required it in exchange for development rights. When making this 
requirement the city expressed its determination that due to the expanded 
private activity that will take place following the development, more public 
spaces will be needed. Added workers will need more access to space and 
dining areas; added visitors will need more recreational amenities.100 Added 
public concerns will need more room for protest. 
The public policy grounds for privileging an entry to land by protesters of 
an activity taking place there, alongside the invitation that such protesters 
should be viewed as enjoying in light of such policy grounds, should cover 
the Zuccotti Park protesters. Whether or not the federal or state 
constitutions protect them (and as seen in Part II, they mostly do not), 
American property law, in light of its own logic and doctrines, should not 
afford a right of action in trespass against them. Constitutional law might be 
out of sync with the current normative understanding of the importance of 
place for effective speech. There is no reason for property law to stumble 
into the same pitfall. 
IV.  POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO PROPERTY LAW’S PROTECTION OF 
PROTEST AND PLACE 
There are several possible objections to our proposed defense in trespass 
cases. These are (A) that the defense is too vague; (B) that the defense will 
excessively intrude upon the sphere of autonomy that, as a normative 
matter, property law should protect and that, as a historical matter, it has 
protected; and (C) that the defense is beside the point, in that it does not 
                                                                                                                     
100 See generally, e.g., Jane E. Schukoske, Housing Linkage: Regulating Development 
Impact on Housing Costs, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1011 (1991). 
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directly tackle the constriction of rights to protest on public lands by means 
of allowable reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. 
A. The Inconsistency/Indeterminacy Objection 
In order to prove the defense of public by necessity, a protester will need 
to convince a court that a protest needed to be in a particular location (and 
in certain instances that it also needed to last for a certain duration in that 
location). The question of whether a protest was necessary in this sense is 
unavoidably wholly fact-based, and one for which there might be no 
irrefutably correct answer. Judges and juries will have to make case-specific 
determinations if our proposal were adopted. There is certainly the 
possibility that courts will reach different decisions regarding similar protest 
contexts, engendering inconsistency within the case law. Ex ante 
indeterminacy will result for the relevant parties (protesters, landowners, 
police, and city officials) as to how any given court in any given case will 
respond to trespass prosecutions. 
This concern is a valid one, yet it is far from determinative. After all, 
courts constantly operationalize property law doctrines that are far more 
fact-specific—and indeed that are far more amorphous in their legal 
terms—than the defense of public, by necessity. The essence of the test for 
nuisance, for example, is whether an interference with another’s property 
was “unreasonable,” and the reasonableness inquiry can entail the balancing 
of a wide array of factors101. If Anglo-American courts have been able for 
centuries now to handle nuisance litigation, we trust that they will also be 
able to manage a trespass doctrine slightly nuanced through a public by 
necessity doctrine. 
Moreover, the public by necessity defense will be valuable not only 
thanks to the results it may produce, but also precisely thanks to the 
                                                                                                                     
101 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY (8th ed., 2014) 782–86 (describing the law of 
nuisance). 
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contentious litigation and factual disputes it will inevitably generate. It is 
valuable to require courts to openly address the question of the need for 
location-specific protest, even if they often get the answer “wrong” or arrive 
at an array of irreconcilable answers. For one thing, litigation in which the 
public by necessity issue is openly and meaningfully aired could itself 
become a tool for educating the public, at least as long as the trials receive 
media coverage. Under current trespass doctrine, with its extremely 
circumscribed necessity defense, there is almost nothing for courts to 
adjudicate, almost no place for expert or specialized testimony, and almost 
no reason the trial, if there is one, should not be over as soon as it begins. 
As the experience of the environmental justice movement teaches, litigation 
itself can be a boon to a movement’s efforts to draw attention to an issue 
even when the courts ultimately find against the movement litigants.102 
B. The Property Rights/Autonomy/Public Order Objection 
One of the most powerful objections to the public by necessity defense is 
that it would trample on private property rights by allowing long-term 
protests on private land against the adamant wishes of the landowners. In 
considering this objection, however, it is important to analytically 
distinguish between (1) the claimed harm to the landowners arising from 
their ideological or philosophical displeasure that protesters are on their 
land, and (2) the claimed harms from other actions attributed to the 
protesters, such as filth and public health hazards (as was claimed with 
regard to the Occupy Wall Street protesters) or harassing patrons and other 
                                                                                                                     
102 The environmental justice movement entailed complex litigation, which in almost all 
cases ended up not resulting in a judgment in favor of the environmental justice litigants. 
Still, litigation was extremely valuable for the movement. See generally, e.g., Luke W. 
Cole, Environmental Justice Litigation: Another Stone in David's Sling, 21 Fordham Urb. 
L.J. 523 (1994). 
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guest of the landowner (as has been a concern with anti-abortion protesters 
on public land). 
The first kind of harm will inarguably be inflicted in some cases in the 
interest of allowing effective protest. However, in practice the number of 
such cases will be very limited. This harm is most keenly felt when the 
protesters are allowed entry into land that is decidedly private—land that is 
not open at all to the public, for example, a private residence. Yet it is hard 
to imagine many instances where the only effective protest would need to 
be located on the land that is the site of a house; most major protests that are 
likely to invoke the public by necessity defense would be directed at retail, 
industrial, educational, or business institutions and their practices and 
influence, rather than at individuals in their individual, private homes. 
Although our law largely treats all private property the same for purposes of 
trespass law, there is no question that the normative case for a right to 
exclude is most robust in properties that are or resemble private homes. The 
discussion of the invitation defense to trespass in Part III illustrated as 
much. Thus the privacy concerns raised by our proposal might well be 
overblown. 
The second kind of harms a landowner might suffer through protesters’ 
rights is even less troubling. True, protesters may breach the peace or inflict 
property damages, but many laws other than trespass protect landowners 
from such dangers, and the introduction of a public by necessity defense in 
no way would preclude those laws’ application. Protesters can be cited and 
fined, or even arrested, for littering or destroying property, or for assault, 
even if they are allowed to protest on the private land  
In this respect, our seemingly transformative proposal in fact marks a 
return to a historical practice respecting criminal (rather than civil) trespass 
liability. Historically, the law protected private property rights but was 
reasonably forgiving toward peaceful intrusions across property lines. In the 
common law, as it came over to the American colonies from Britain, 
criminal trespass was an offense that required not only non-permissive 
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entering of another’s land but also some breach of the peace. It was not an 
automatic offense triggered by non-permissive entry. 103  Moreover, even 
well into the twentieth century, criminal trespass in certain states was 
understood as non-permissive entry accompanied by an affirmative breach 
of the peace.104  
Legal and social historians have not provided a full account of why 
criminal trespass laws tightened in the United States so much that by the 
late twentieth century, the typical state law required only non-permissive 
entry for a finding for criminal trespass. But whatever the original reasons 
for the change, we think that at least in the context of protest the old 
criminal trespass rule struck a good balance between protection of the 
interests of non-landowners and the interests of landowners. Our public by 
necessity defense would re-strike that balance: landowners would not be 
empowered to automatically use the force of the state against non-
permissive entrants, but only where there was no necessity for the protest on 
private land or where the intruders caused harm beyond the intrusion itself. 
 C. The Property Law Is the Wrong Venue Objection 
Another possible objection to our proposal is that it engages the wrong 
doctrinal field—private law, the law of trespass, rather than public law, the 
First Amendment rights of speech and assembly. The bulwark protections 
for protest in the United States have always been the latter. Accordingly, the 
conventional move in legal discourse indeed has been to seek to privilege 
                                                                                                                     
103 See, e.g., In re Appeal No. 631 (77), 383 A.2d 684, 685 (Md. 1978) (“A mere trespass 
to real property is not a crime at common law unless it amounts to a breach of the 
peace.”). The common law did not prevent the landowner from bringing a civil suit 
against the trespassers, and neither would our proposal, even if the defense of public by 
necessity were applicable. 
104 For example, in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, (1964), the United States 
Supreme Court overturned the conviction of civil rights protesters for criminal trespass 
on the grounds that, when they were arrested, the criminal trespass law of South Carolina 
required damage to property in addition to proof of a non-permissive entry. 
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protest by characterizing private land as “public” in a constitutional sense. 
Once that move is made, the argument becomes that First Amendment 
rights apply to allow protest on the private public forum, as discussed in 
Part II(B). But as reviewed there, the case law is now hostile to the 
characterization of private land as public for constitutional purposes. More 
generally, constitutional law has adopted a host of mechanisms limiting 
protesters’ access to lands of all types.   
Therefore we think that reforming private, property, law might be a more 
promising way to bring about change, ultimately, in public, constitutional 
law. The state law of trespass operates free of even indirect influences of the 
United States Supreme Court,105 and state courts might be more likely to be 
open to innovation in this realm even in the absence of any federal law 
encouragement.  In addition, as is always the case with reforms in state law, 
the presence of 50 jurisdictions as potential first adopters of the suggested 
public by necessity defense is a major practical advantage. 
Finally, while the cost of tackling property law rather than constitutional 
law is that the doctrines respecting government’s ability to regulate the 
place, time, and manner of speech remain largely intact, indirect change 
might ensue. If the defense of public by necessity were adopted and as a 
result law becomes more accommodating of location-specific protest on 
private or semi-private land, a strong argument for greater room for 
location-specific protest on public land will inevitably emerge. Precisely 
because the usual assumption would be that protest should be 
accommodated to a greater extent on public land than on private land, the 
public by necessity defense would be a powerful rhetorical basis for 
                                                                                                                     
105 See generally Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that 
state law may limit owners’ rights under trespass law to promote free speech without 
giving rise to a federal takings claim). 
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rethinking the equation of place restrictions with time and manner 
restrictions.   
CONCLUSION 
Unitary exclusion-centric theories notwithstanding, property law 
inevitably involves some balancing of competing private and public 
interests. In the case of trespass and location-specific protest, that balance 
has been missing or at least heavily biased towards private interests. We 
argue for a public by necessity defense to establish a better balance, a 
balance that while still prioritizing the rights of owners, will recognize that 
both the history of our legal system and the normative concerns of our 
democratic system require that certain expressive entries to specific lands be 
privileged.  
